Mittenwald
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Ο Mittenwald αυτή τη στιγμή δεν είναι συνδεδεμένος. Είναι 59 ετών, επαγγέλεται Καθηγητής/τρια και μας γράφει απο Θεσσαλονίκη (Θεσσαλονίκη). Έχει γράψει 812 μηνύματα.
11-04-09
15:15
Γιατί είναι περίεργο;
Μόνος σου το λες:
Ελπίζω να είναι φανερό πια.
Σημείωση: Το μήνυμα αυτό γράφτηκε 15 χρόνια πριν. Ο συντάκτης του πιθανόν να έχει αλλάξει απόψεις έκτοτε.
Mittenwald
Πολύ δραστήριο μέλος
Ο Mittenwald αυτή τη στιγμή δεν είναι συνδεδεμένος. Είναι 59 ετών, επαγγέλεται Καθηγητής/τρια και μας γράφει απο Θεσσαλονίκη (Θεσσαλονίκη). Έχει γράψει 812 μηνύματα.
11-04-09
15:10
Στην Παρισινή "LE CONSTITUΤΙONEL" της 6ης Ιουνίου 1821, δημοσιεύθηκε το εξής:
"Allocution de Germanicus, exarque de la premiè Achaie, archeveque de Patras, au clergè et aux fidèles du Péloponèse, prononcée dans le couvent des frères Laures du mont Vélin, le 8(20) mars 1821"
Σε μετάφραση:
"Διακήρυξις του Γερμανού, Εξάρχου της πρώτης κατά την τάξιν Αχαΐας, Αρχιεπισκόπου Πατρών, πρός τόν Κλήρον και τους πιστούς της Πελοποννήσου, η οποία εξεφωνήθη εντός της Μονής των Αδελφών της Λαύρας του όρους Βελιά την 8ην (20ήν) Μαρτίου 1821"
Η διακήρυξη:
"... Αύριον, ακολουθούντες τον Σταυρόν, θα βαδίσωμεν προς αυτήν την πόλιν των Πατρών, της οποίας η γη είναι ηγιασμένη από το αίμα το ενδόξου Μάρτυρος Αποστόλου Αγίου Ανδρέου. Ο Κύριος θα εκατονταπλασιάσει το θάρρος σας. Ίνα δε προστεθούν εις υμάς αι αναγκαίαι διά να αναζωογονηθήτε δυνάμεις, σάς απαλλάσσω από την νηστείαν της Τεσσαρακοστής, την οποίαν τηρούμεν.
Στρατιώται του Σταυρού, ότι καλείσθε να υπερασπισθήτε, είναι αυτό τούτο το θέλημα του Ουρανού! Εις το όνομα του Πατρός και του Υιού και του Αγίου Πνεύματος να είσθε ευλογημένοι και συγκεχωρημένοι από πάσας τας αμαρτίας σας".
Όσοι ενδιαφέρονται, ας δουν σε μεγάλη ανάλυση την εφημερίδα στο:
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/_rLoTIBt4A1M/Scsyyf8mazI/AAAAAAAAAUc/COi3hRXE5J8/s1600-h/σάρωση0001.jpg
"Allocution de Germanicus, exarque de la premiè Achaie, archeveque de Patras, au clergè et aux fidèles du Péloponèse, prononcée dans le couvent des frères Laures du mont Vélin, le 8(20) mars 1821"
Σε μετάφραση:
"Διακήρυξις του Γερμανού, Εξάρχου της πρώτης κατά την τάξιν Αχαΐας, Αρχιεπισκόπου Πατρών, πρός τόν Κλήρον και τους πιστούς της Πελοποννήσου, η οποία εξεφωνήθη εντός της Μονής των Αδελφών της Λαύρας του όρους Βελιά την 8ην (20ήν) Μαρτίου 1821"
Η διακήρυξη:
"... Αύριον, ακολουθούντες τον Σταυρόν, θα βαδίσωμεν προς αυτήν την πόλιν των Πατρών, της οποίας η γη είναι ηγιασμένη από το αίμα το ενδόξου Μάρτυρος Αποστόλου Αγίου Ανδρέου. Ο Κύριος θα εκατονταπλασιάσει το θάρρος σας. Ίνα δε προστεθούν εις υμάς αι αναγκαίαι διά να αναζωογονηθήτε δυνάμεις, σάς απαλλάσσω από την νηστείαν της Τεσσαρακοστής, την οποίαν τηρούμεν.
Στρατιώται του Σταυρού, ότι καλείσθε να υπερασπισθήτε, είναι αυτό τούτο το θέλημα του Ουρανού! Εις το όνομα του Πατρός και του Υιού και του Αγίου Πνεύματος να είσθε ευλογημένοι και συγκεχωρημένοι από πάσας τας αμαρτίας σας".
Όσοι ενδιαφέρονται, ας δουν σε μεγάλη ανάλυση την εφημερίδα στο:
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/_rLoTIBt4A1M/Scsyyf8mazI/AAAAAAAAAUc/COi3hRXE5J8/s1600-h/σάρωση0001.jpg
Σημείωση: Το μήνυμα αυτό γράφτηκε 15 χρόνια πριν. Ο συντάκτης του πιθανόν να έχει αλλάξει απόψεις έκτοτε.
Mittenwald
Πολύ δραστήριο μέλος
Ο Mittenwald αυτή τη στιγμή δεν είναι συνδεδεμένος. Είναι 59 ετών, επαγγέλεται Καθηγητής/τρια και μας γράφει απο Θεσσαλονίκη (Θεσσαλονίκη). Έχει γράψει 812 μηνύματα.
06-04-09
20:04
Παρακαλώ να μην συγχωνευθεί με το προηγούμενο.
Πόσοι γνωρίζουν ότι σήμερα είναι η επέτειος του δεύτερου Όχι;
Σαν σήμερα, 6 Απριλίου 1941, ο Γερμανός πρέσβης στην Αθήνα Έμπραχ επισκέπτεται ξημερώματα τον πρωθυπουργό Κορυζή και του ανακοινώνει ότι ο Γερμανικός στρατός θα εισβάλει στην Ελλάδα, λόγω της παρουσίας αγγλικών δυνάμεων. Ο πρωθυπουργός Κορυζής απάντησε το δεύτερο μεγάλο ΟΧΙ.
Στα οχυρά της «Γραμμής Μεταξά» στην Μακεδονία και τη Θράκη (Νυμφαία, Εχίνος, Ρούπελ, Ιστίμπεη) οι Έλληνες μαχητές αμύνονται ηρωικά, κερδίζουν κάποιες μάχες και, όταν λήγει ο άνισος αγώνας τους, δέχονται στρατιωτικές τιμές από τον ίδιο τον αντίπαλο τους: «Η ελληνική ευψυχία ανεγνωρίσθη από τους ίδιους τους Γερμανούς. Ο Γερμανός συνταγματάρχης που παρέλαβε το οχυρό Παλιουριώνες συνεχάρη τον διοικητή του οχυρού και τη φρουρά, εξέφρασε τον θαυμασμό του για την αντίσταση και κάλεσε τον διοικητή τού οχυρού να επιθεωρήσει μαζί του το γερμανικό τάγμα, ενώ διέταξε να υψωθεί η γερμανική σημαία μόνο μετά την αναχώρηση των Ελλήνων. Ο Γερμανός αξιωματικός στον οποίο παρεδόθη το Ρούπελ εξέφρασε την υπερηφάνεια του, διότι επολέμησε εναντίον ενός τόσο γενναίου αντιπάλου». (Σπύρος Μαρκεζίνης, Σύγχρονη Ιστορία της Ελλάδος, τόμος 1ος, σ.224, Αθήνα 1994).
Επίσης, μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον έχει το τι αναφέρει στο ημερολόγιό του ο Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel (στρατάρχης του Reich και αρχηγός της OKW):
The news reached us on our return journey through France that Mussolini was planning to attack Greece by force of arms because the Greeks had rejected his demands that they cede certain territories to Albania. Count Ciano, his foreign secretary, was the instigator of the whole dispute. Both of these Italian statesmen had been lulled by the belief—in which they had been reassured by the governor of Albania—that it would only take a little sabre-rattling for the Greeks to give way without further ado.
The Führer described this “encore” by our ally as downright madness, and at once decided to go down through Munich for a meeting with Mussolini.
[...]
The meeting took place the next morning in Florence. Mussolini greeted the Führer with the memorable words, “Führer, we are on the march!” It was too late to stave off the disaster.
[...]
We left for home immediately after lunch. I had meanwhile ordered our military attaché there to send us daily telegrams on the war in the Albanian–Greek theatre; I had sworn him to tell only the unvarnished truth. Hitler did not really lose his temper until we were in the train, and then he began to fulminate about this new “adventure,” as he was already terming it. He had sternly warned the Duce of the folly of taking it all so lightly: and it was a folly, he said, to invade at this time of year, and with only two or three divisions, advancing into the mountains bordering Greece where the weather alone would very shortly call a halt to the whole operation. In his view, as he had told Mussolini, the only possible outcome was a military catastrophe; but Mussolini had promised to send more divisions into Albania should these weak forces be inadequate to smash the attack through. By Mussoliniʼs own account, however, it would take several weeks for even one extra division to disembark in Albaniaʼs [two] primitive harbours. If he had wanted so much to pick a fight with poor little Greece, Hitler continued, why on earth had he not attacked Malta or Crete? That would still have made some sense in the context of our war with Britain in the Mediterranean, especially in view of the unenviable position of the Italians fighting in North Africa.
[...]
Within a very few weeks everything had happened just as Hitler had predicted: the feeble Italian offensive, launched without sufficient reserves, had not only become hopelessly bogged down in the heavy going but ended up in a parlous situation as a combined result of a counter-offensive by the Greeks and the foul weather. That was when the requests for aid began to come. The poor dockyard facilities in Albania were causing a bad enough bottleneck in the supply organisation for the Italian fighting units, let alone allowing the Italians to make provision for the injection of reserves into the fight. Hitler was willing to send a mountain division, but there was no hope of sending it either by sea or across Yugoslavia; we lent a hand with our last Mediterranean-based German troopships and with air force transport squadrons. Had the advent of winter not equally mitigated the Greek counter-offensive and blunted its impact, the sorry end of the adventure would have come six weeks later.
In recognition of this, and inspired by the feeling that he ought not leave his ally to find his own way out of the predicament—an honourable instinct which Mussolini, had the tables been turned, would have felt able to ignore at any time—Hitler evolved the plan of sending an army across Hungary and Bulgaria into Greece in the following spring, in the hope that at least in Albania Italy would be able to hold out until then. It would of course have been more propitious to approach Yugoslavia about the possibility of moving up German troops for the “rescue” of Mussolini by means of the shortest overland route [i.e., across Yugoslavia], but the Führer categorically refused even to contemplate this military proposal: in no circumstances did he want to jeopardise Yugoslaviaʼs position as a neutral, which was equally in Italyʼs own interests.
[...]
Preparations for a war with Greece—a campaign which the Führer repeatedly told us he deeply regretted—preoccupied the War Office and the OKW operations staff all winter.
[...]
Even if it was too much to ask of our good fortune that Italy should have stayed out of the war altogether as a benevolent neutral, just consider the difference if Hitler had been able to prevent their irresponsible attack on Greece. What would we not have saved by way of aid to Italy for her senseless Balkan war? In all probability there would not have been any uprising in Yugoslavia in an attempt to force her entry into the war on the side of the enemies of the Axis, just to oblige Britain and the Soviet Union. How differently things would then have looked in Russia in 1941. We would have been in a far stronger position, and above all we should not have lost those two months. Just imagine: we would not have frozen to a standstill in the snow and ice, with temperatures of minus forty-five degrees just twenty miles outside Moscow, a city hopelessly encircled from the north, west and south, at the end of that November. We should have had two clear months before that infernal cold weather closed in—and there was nothing like it in the winters that followed anyway!
[...]
Basically, the Führer wanted to give the Greeks an honourable settlement in recognition of their brave struggle and of their blamelessness for this war: after all the Italians had started it. He ordered the release and repatriation of all their prisoners of war as soon as they had been disarmed.
[...]
The quarrel over the troopsʼ victorious entry into Athens was a chapter to itself: Hitler wanted to do without a special parade, to avoid injuring Greek national pride. Mussolini, alas, insisted on a glorious entry into the city for his Italian troops (who first had to be rushed up to the city as they had dawdled several daysʼ march behind the German troops who had expelled the British forces). The Führer yielded to the Italian demand and together the German and Italian troops marched into Athens. This miserable spectacle, laid on by our gallant ally whom they had honourably beaten, must have produced some hollow laughter from the Greeks.
Πόσοι γνωρίζουν ότι σήμερα είναι η επέτειος του δεύτερου Όχι;
Σαν σήμερα, 6 Απριλίου 1941, ο Γερμανός πρέσβης στην Αθήνα Έμπραχ επισκέπτεται ξημερώματα τον πρωθυπουργό Κορυζή και του ανακοινώνει ότι ο Γερμανικός στρατός θα εισβάλει στην Ελλάδα, λόγω της παρουσίας αγγλικών δυνάμεων. Ο πρωθυπουργός Κορυζής απάντησε το δεύτερο μεγάλο ΟΧΙ.
Στα οχυρά της «Γραμμής Μεταξά» στην Μακεδονία και τη Θράκη (Νυμφαία, Εχίνος, Ρούπελ, Ιστίμπεη) οι Έλληνες μαχητές αμύνονται ηρωικά, κερδίζουν κάποιες μάχες και, όταν λήγει ο άνισος αγώνας τους, δέχονται στρατιωτικές τιμές από τον ίδιο τον αντίπαλο τους: «Η ελληνική ευψυχία ανεγνωρίσθη από τους ίδιους τους Γερμανούς. Ο Γερμανός συνταγματάρχης που παρέλαβε το οχυρό Παλιουριώνες συνεχάρη τον διοικητή του οχυρού και τη φρουρά, εξέφρασε τον θαυμασμό του για την αντίσταση και κάλεσε τον διοικητή τού οχυρού να επιθεωρήσει μαζί του το γερμανικό τάγμα, ενώ διέταξε να υψωθεί η γερμανική σημαία μόνο μετά την αναχώρηση των Ελλήνων. Ο Γερμανός αξιωματικός στον οποίο παρεδόθη το Ρούπελ εξέφρασε την υπερηφάνεια του, διότι επολέμησε εναντίον ενός τόσο γενναίου αντιπάλου». (Σπύρος Μαρκεζίνης, Σύγχρονη Ιστορία της Ελλάδος, τόμος 1ος, σ.224, Αθήνα 1994).
Επίσης, μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον έχει το τι αναφέρει στο ημερολόγιό του ο Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel (στρατάρχης του Reich και αρχηγός της OKW):
The news reached us on our return journey through France that Mussolini was planning to attack Greece by force of arms because the Greeks had rejected his demands that they cede certain territories to Albania. Count Ciano, his foreign secretary, was the instigator of the whole dispute. Both of these Italian statesmen had been lulled by the belief—in which they had been reassured by the governor of Albania—that it would only take a little sabre-rattling for the Greeks to give way without further ado.
The Führer described this “encore” by our ally as downright madness, and at once decided to go down through Munich for a meeting with Mussolini.
[...]
The meeting took place the next morning in Florence. Mussolini greeted the Führer with the memorable words, “Führer, we are on the march!” It was too late to stave off the disaster.
[...]
We left for home immediately after lunch. I had meanwhile ordered our military attaché there to send us daily telegrams on the war in the Albanian–Greek theatre; I had sworn him to tell only the unvarnished truth. Hitler did not really lose his temper until we were in the train, and then he began to fulminate about this new “adventure,” as he was already terming it. He had sternly warned the Duce of the folly of taking it all so lightly: and it was a folly, he said, to invade at this time of year, and with only two or three divisions, advancing into the mountains bordering Greece where the weather alone would very shortly call a halt to the whole operation. In his view, as he had told Mussolini, the only possible outcome was a military catastrophe; but Mussolini had promised to send more divisions into Albania should these weak forces be inadequate to smash the attack through. By Mussoliniʼs own account, however, it would take several weeks for even one extra division to disembark in Albaniaʼs [two] primitive harbours. If he had wanted so much to pick a fight with poor little Greece, Hitler continued, why on earth had he not attacked Malta or Crete? That would still have made some sense in the context of our war with Britain in the Mediterranean, especially in view of the unenviable position of the Italians fighting in North Africa.
[...]
Within a very few weeks everything had happened just as Hitler had predicted: the feeble Italian offensive, launched without sufficient reserves, had not only become hopelessly bogged down in the heavy going but ended up in a parlous situation as a combined result of a counter-offensive by the Greeks and the foul weather. That was when the requests for aid began to come. The poor dockyard facilities in Albania were causing a bad enough bottleneck in the supply organisation for the Italian fighting units, let alone allowing the Italians to make provision for the injection of reserves into the fight. Hitler was willing to send a mountain division, but there was no hope of sending it either by sea or across Yugoslavia; we lent a hand with our last Mediterranean-based German troopships and with air force transport squadrons. Had the advent of winter not equally mitigated the Greek counter-offensive and blunted its impact, the sorry end of the adventure would have come six weeks later.
In recognition of this, and inspired by the feeling that he ought not leave his ally to find his own way out of the predicament—an honourable instinct which Mussolini, had the tables been turned, would have felt able to ignore at any time—Hitler evolved the plan of sending an army across Hungary and Bulgaria into Greece in the following spring, in the hope that at least in Albania Italy would be able to hold out until then. It would of course have been more propitious to approach Yugoslavia about the possibility of moving up German troops for the “rescue” of Mussolini by means of the shortest overland route [i.e., across Yugoslavia], but the Führer categorically refused even to contemplate this military proposal: in no circumstances did he want to jeopardise Yugoslaviaʼs position as a neutral, which was equally in Italyʼs own interests.
[...]
Preparations for a war with Greece—a campaign which the Führer repeatedly told us he deeply regretted—preoccupied the War Office and the OKW operations staff all winter.
[...]
Even if it was too much to ask of our good fortune that Italy should have stayed out of the war altogether as a benevolent neutral, just consider the difference if Hitler had been able to prevent their irresponsible attack on Greece. What would we not have saved by way of aid to Italy for her senseless Balkan war? In all probability there would not have been any uprising in Yugoslavia in an attempt to force her entry into the war on the side of the enemies of the Axis, just to oblige Britain and the Soviet Union. How differently things would then have looked in Russia in 1941. We would have been in a far stronger position, and above all we should not have lost those two months. Just imagine: we would not have frozen to a standstill in the snow and ice, with temperatures of minus forty-five degrees just twenty miles outside Moscow, a city hopelessly encircled from the north, west and south, at the end of that November. We should have had two clear months before that infernal cold weather closed in—and there was nothing like it in the winters that followed anyway!
[...]
Basically, the Führer wanted to give the Greeks an honourable settlement in recognition of their brave struggle and of their blamelessness for this war: after all the Italians had started it. He ordered the release and repatriation of all their prisoners of war as soon as they had been disarmed.
[...]
The quarrel over the troopsʼ victorious entry into Athens was a chapter to itself: Hitler wanted to do without a special parade, to avoid injuring Greek national pride. Mussolini, alas, insisted on a glorious entry into the city for his Italian troops (who first had to be rushed up to the city as they had dawdled several daysʼ march behind the German troops who had expelled the British forces). The Führer yielded to the Italian demand and together the German and Italian troops marched into Athens. This miserable spectacle, laid on by our gallant ally whom they had honourably beaten, must have produced some hollow laughter from the Greeks.
Σημείωση: Το μήνυμα αυτό γράφτηκε 15 χρόνια πριν. Ο συντάκτης του πιθανόν να έχει αλλάξει απόψεις έκτοτε.
Mittenwald
Πολύ δραστήριο μέλος
Ο Mittenwald αυτή τη στιγμή δεν είναι συνδεδεμένος. Είναι 59 ετών, επαγγέλεται Καθηγητής/τρια και μας γράφει απο Θεσσαλονίκη (Θεσσαλονίκη). Έχει γράψει 812 μηνύματα.
06-04-09
19:21
Δυστυχώς, για άλλη μια φορά ο κ. Δήμου δε μας τα λέει καλά.
Σκοπίμως αποκρύπτει σοβαρές πηγές με σκοπό να "αποδείξει" τα λεγόμενά του.
Ας δούμε τι λέει ο γνωστός ιστορικός Σαράντος Καργάκος:
Και μια προσωπική εκτίμηση περί της "αναθεώρησης" της Ιστορίας:
Υπάρχει μια γενικότερη προσπάθεια αναγωγής των (σύγχρονων) ελληνικών πολέμων σε "ιμπεριαλιστικούς" (π.χ., Μικρασιατική εκστρατεία).
Πουθενά δεν γίνεται λόγος από τους "αναθεωρητές" για το πως αντιμετώπιζαν οι Τούρκοι τους Έλληνες (και όχι μόνον τους Έλληνες αλλά τους Χριστιανούς γενικότερα).
Και όταν φανεί ότι οι Τούρκοι θεωρούσαν τους Χριστιανούς "κατώτερους" (δηλαδή αναλώσιμους), θα φανεί κι ότι ήταν στη γενικότερη αντίληψή τους η εξαφάνισή τους από τη στιγμή που δεν τους χρειάζονταν.
Σκοπίμως αποκρύπτει σοβαρές πηγές με σκοπό να "αποδείξει" τα λεγόμενά του.
Ας δούμε τι λέει ο γνωστός ιστορικός Σαράντος Καργάκος:
Και μια προσωπική εκτίμηση περί της "αναθεώρησης" της Ιστορίας:
Υπάρχει μια γενικότερη προσπάθεια αναγωγής των (σύγχρονων) ελληνικών πολέμων σε "ιμπεριαλιστικούς" (π.χ., Μικρασιατική εκστρατεία).
Πουθενά δεν γίνεται λόγος από τους "αναθεωρητές" για το πως αντιμετώπιζαν οι Τούρκοι τους Έλληνες (και όχι μόνον τους Έλληνες αλλά τους Χριστιανούς γενικότερα).
Και όταν φανεί ότι οι Τούρκοι θεωρούσαν τους Χριστιανούς "κατώτερους" (δηλαδή αναλώσιμους), θα φανεί κι ότι ήταν στη γενικότερη αντίληψή τους η εξαφάνισή τους από τη στιγμή που δεν τους χρειάζονταν.
Σημείωση: Το μήνυμα αυτό γράφτηκε 15 χρόνια πριν. Ο συντάκτης του πιθανόν να έχει αλλάξει απόψεις έκτοτε.